Application of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to
Housing Leases
BrianS. Prestest
Landlords often deny a prospective tenant's lease application based

on deficiencies in the tenant's credit report. It is unclear whether a landlord is required by federal statute to inform a rejected applicant of the
specific reasonhis credit was deemed deficient. This Comment attempts
to resolve this ambiguity in federal law by determining whether the
Equal Credit Opportunity Acte ("ECOA") applies to leases. If the ECOA
applies to leases, then landlords taking adverse action 2 on lease applications must inform applicants of the specific reasons their applications
were denied. The answer to this question is important to the delicate balance between landlord and tenant protections because such information
can be extremely valuable to tenants seeking to bring housing discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act of 1968' and the Civil Rights Act

of 1866.4 The Comment concludes that courts should resolve this issue by
taking into account state law governing permissible terms of housing

lease contracts in order to determine whether a given lease involves "defer[red] payment of debt," the necessary element of a "credit" transaction under the ECOA.
This Comment focuses narrowly on whether the ECOA applies to

residential housing leases, rather than leases of other sorts,6 for several
reasons. First, because of the persistence and prevalence of housing discrimination, 7 the issue of whether the ECOA applies in this particular
t

B.A. 1997, Wake Forest University; J.D. Candidate 2001, The University of Chicago.
15 USC §§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
2
The ECOA, 15 USC § 1691(d)(6) defines "adverse action" as "a denial or revocation of
credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested." See also 12 CFR § 202.2(c)(1) (1999)
(defining adverse action).
3 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 3601-3619,3631
(1994 & Supp I1 1996).
4
Act of April 9,1866,14 Stat 27, codified in part at 42 USC § 1982 (1994).
5 See 15 USC § 1691a(d).
6 This Comment does not consider whether the ECOA applies to leases for goods or commercial property.
7
"[R]acial discrimination in housing remains the most visible vestige of formal segregation
... [and] laws prohibiting discrimination in housing have not resulted in the elimination of segregated
housing patterns." Leland B. Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provisionsof
the 1988 Amendments to the FairHousingAct, 7 Admin L J Am U 59,62 (1993). See also James A.
Kushner, The FairHousing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generationof FairHousing,42
Vand L Rev 1049,1050-51 (1989) ("[H]ousing remains the most segregated aspect of American life
1
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context is uniquely important. Individuals seeking to rent housing are

protected from discrimination primarily by the Fair Housing Act
("FHA") and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ("CRA" or "Section 1982"). 8
Many would-be tenants, however, find they are unable to successfully
invoke the protections of such statutes 9 when landlords deny their applications based on deficiencies in their credit reports.'
Second, ECOA-mandated reporting stands to benefit prospective
tenants uniquely. Landlords, more than other lessors, use credit reports
to determine the likelihood of a prospective tenant's willingness and
ability to make timely rent payments." Under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,2 a landlord taking adverse action on a prospective tenant's application based on that tenant's credit report need only inform the applicant

that his application was denied based on his credit report and then tell
him where he may obtain a copy of his credit report. 3 Given this limited
reporting requirement, landlords may be able to use applicants' credit

reports as a pretext for prohibited discrimination based on race, marital
status, or other suspect classifications. The tenant may be left to wonder
why his credit was insufficient or what he could have done to meet the

landlord's credit standards. Without such information, many tenants are
denied leases and similarly denied the only information available for

them to know whether their landlords' objections were legitimate and
honest as opposed to mere pretext for illegal discrimination. Application
and the greatest failure of the civil rights revolution.").
8 See, for example, Julian Bond, HistoricalPerspectiveson FairHousing,29 John Marshall L
Rev 315,323 (1996) (noting that the Fair Housing Act became an important part of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act). See also Kushner,42 Vand L Rev at 1096 (cited in note 7) ("The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 is the most significant civil rights enactment in a generation, providing the mechanisms to enforce the fair housing laws effectively.").
Many state laws also protect tenants from housing discrimination. States may provide protections in addition to, but not falling below, the federal floors established in the FHA and CRA.
9 "Racially segregated housing and the myriad of secondary effects caused thereby, however,
are as big a problem today, as they were in 1968." Ware, 7 Admin L J Am U at 116 (cited in note 7).
10 Consumer credit reports, "credit reports" for short, are summaries of individuals' outstanding debt and lines of credit (for example, in the form of mortgages, loans, credit card debts,judgment
liens). Credit reports typically disclose an individual's balance, any amount past due, and payment
history for all accounts. Credit reports are available for a fee, and are usually obtained from one of
the three major credit reporting agencies (Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union).
11 Landlords' use of credit reports to screen tenants is increasing. See Elizabeth Rhodes, Credit
Report More ImportantThan Ever: Landlords;Lenders Rely More Than Ever on CreditReports that
Can Shut You Out of Housing Choices,Greensboro News & Record E2 (Sept 5,1999) (stating that
as computers have made credit reports both cheaper and more accessible, both large and small
landlords have increased their use of credit reports). In fact, credit may be the largest obstacle to
home ownership with 38 percent of surveyed applicants citing it as a problem in obtaining a mortgage. See id, citing Fannie Mae 1998 Survey (noting that credit is a larger obstacle to home ownership
than discrimination or unemployment).
12
15 USC §§ 1681-1681u (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
13 15 USC § 1681m(a).
14
Creditors may legally use an "empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound,
credit scoring system" provided such system meets certain criteria. 12 CFR § 202.2(p) (1999).
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of the ECOA to residential lease transactions would force landlords to
provide tenants with the specific reasons their credit reports were inadequate. This information might then be utilized by tenants (and their lawyers) to defeat pretextual defenses by landlords and to better determine
the likelihood of a successful lawsuit under the various statutes prohibiting housing discrimination.
Third, the stakes are higher in the residential lease context than they
are for commercial leases or leases for the sale of goods. Whether prospective tenants stand to benefit from ECOA reporting requirements is
particularly important because housing is a fundamental human need
and because discrimination resulting in failure to obtain a given lease
must be solved quickly if it is to aid a given prospective tenant unable to
rent a particular unit.This Comment evaluates whether the ECOA applies to residential
leases by addressing whether leases involve "defer[red] payment of
debt"-the necessary element of "credit" needed to invoke the ECOA.
Part I describes the history and mandates of the ECOA, distinguishes the
ECOA from other statutes that protect applicants for rental housing, and
concludes that applying the ECOA to housing leases would prevent
landlords from circumventing the protections of the FHA and CRA and
provide valuable information for plaintiffs in housing discrimination
cases.
Part II argues that existing authority-the text of the ECOA, agency
interpretation, and judicial preceden -fails to provide a dispositive answer to the question of whether the ECOA includes leases in its definition of "credit" while overlooking mandatory state law controlling the
terms of residential leases. Part III suggests that categorization of lease
transactions is best accomplished by focusing on the specific terms of the
lease under consideration, taking into account applicable state background rules, to determine whether a given lease constitutes "credit."

15 "Shelter is such a basic human need that it should be recognized that alternative housing
must and will be obtained during the pendency of complaint enforcement. This reality requires that
the enforcement mechanism not only be fair, but fast if the complaint is to be resolved in a way that
results in the aggrieved individual's actually acquiring the premises that were denied before settling

into another abode." Ware, 7 Admin L J Am U at 116-17 (cited in note 7).
16 The legislative history of the ECOA is unhelpful because it does not discuss whether

"credit" includes leases. See, for example, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, S Rep No 589,94th Cong,
2d Sess (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 403; Depository Institutions Amendments of 1974, S Rep
No 902, 93d Cong, 2d Sess (1974), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 6119; Consumer Leasing Act of 1976,
S Rep No 590,94th Cong, 2d Sess (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 431. See also Brothersv First
Leasing,724 F2d 789,793 n 10 (9th Cir 1984) (noting that the legislative history of the ECOA does
not discuss the "applicability or non-applicability of the ECOA to consumer leases"). Accord,
Fergusonv Park City Mobile Homes, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010, *7 (N D Ill) ("there is no legislative
history indicating whether [the inclusion of leases] was the intent of the legislature"). The legislative
history does, however, speak to the purpose of the statute, which is discussed in Part II.C.
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I. THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY AcT

A.

History of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act

On October 28,1974,' 7 Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act18 as an amendment to the larger Consumer Credit Protection
Act ("CCPA")." Originally, the ECOA's Title VII prohibited discrimination by creditors based on sex and marital status only. It was intended
to address the difficulties faced by women applying for consumer credit.2 '

The ECOA was revised in 1976 to prohibit discrimination based on a
host of other categorizations including race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance benefits, and exercise of rights under
the CCPA.= The purpose of the amendments was to address the difficulties faced by the newly covered groups when applying for consumer
credit.2
17 The earliest version of the ECOA was passed by the Senate in a 90 to 0 vote in 1973, S 2101,
93d Cong, 1st Sess (June 28,1973), in 119 Cong Rec 25423 (July 23,1973), but later died in the House.
The ECOA was again offered in the Senate as an amendment to HR 11221 and was finally adopted
in 1974, when a Conference Committee reconciled S 3492 with HR 14856.
18 Pub L No 90-321, as amended by Pub L No 93-495,88 Stat 1521 (1974), codified at 15 USC

§§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp IV 1998). See Kathleen E. Keest, ResidentialMortgage Litigatiorn Credit
Discrimination,989 PLI/Corp 569,576 (1997) (describing the evolution of the ECOA from its earliest
incarnations to its current form). For a summary of the ECOA, see Jeffrey I. Langer and Andrew T.
Semmelman, CreditorListScreening Practices:CertainImplications Under the FairCredit Reporting
Act and the Equal Credit Reporting Act, 43 Bus Law 1123,1131 (1988) (summarizing the ECOA's
prohibitions and applying the ECOA to credit list screening practices).
19 15 USC §§ 1601-1693r (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
20 15 USC § 1691(a) (1974).
21 See Truth in Lending Act Amendments, S Rep No 278, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1973) (stating
that the purpose of the ECOA is to combat discrimination based on sex or marital status and providing specific examples of such discrimination). See also National Commission on Consumer Finance, Consumer Credit in the UnitedStates 152-53 (1972) (outlining the problems faced by women
applying for consumer credit, including women's greater difficulties applying for mortgages compared to men in the same economic bracket, inability of married women to obtain credit independent
of their husbands' credit, and divorced women's difficulties attempting to rely on a credit history
obtained during marriage).
22 Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub L No 94-239,90 Stat 251 (1976),
codified at 15 USC §§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
23 The House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing proposed a bill prohibiting creditors from discriminating based on race, color, religion, national origin, and age. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1975, HR Rep No 94-210,94th Cong, 1st Sess 3-4 (1975) (focusing on age
discrimination in credit transactions as the motivating factor for HR 5616). The Senate concurred
with the House, focusing on both age and race-based discrimination. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Amendments and Consumer Leasing Act-1975: Hearings on S 483, S 1900, S 1927, S 1961 and HR
5616 Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong, 1st Sess (1975). Likewise, the Department of Justice supported broadening the terms of the ECOA. Id at 318. On February 2,1976, the Senate passed a bill to amend the
ECOA by broadening prohibited discrimination to include discrimination based on age, race, color,
religion, national origin, receipt of public assistance benefits, and exercise of rights under the CCPA.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, S Rep No 589, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 1-2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
USCCAN 403,403-04. On March 9,1976 the Conference Report was approved, see id, and on March
23,1976, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments were signed into law by President Ford.
Pub L No 94-239,90 Stat 251 (1976), codified at 15 USC §§ 1691-1691f (1994 & Supp IV 1998).
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Both the original ECOA and the 1976 Amendments24 are implemented by Regulation B,2 originally adopted by the Federal Reserve

Board ("FRB") in 1977 pursuant to statutory authority granted by the
ECOA.26 Regulation B defines the relevant terms of the ECOA and provides commentary explaining how the FRB will resolve certain ambigui-

ties when interpreting and applying the ECOA.r
B.

Mandates of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Today, the ECOA's mandates fall into two categories. First, the

ECOA prohibits a "creditor" from certain types of discrimination against

an "applicant" in a "credit transaction."' ' Prohibited discrimination under
the ECOA is limited to discrimination based on sex, marital status, race,
color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance, or the
good-faith exercise of rights under the CCPA.f

Second (and more relevant to this Comment), in furtherance of its
anti-discriminatory aim, the ECOA prescribes certain actions creditors
must take or refrain from taking. More specifically, the ECOA establishes
rules governing the type of information creditors may request during the

application' ° and evaluation process,' and it requires creditors to notify
applicants of reasons for adverse action taken on their applications. 2

Creditors who fail to comply with the notification requirements of the
ECOA (or the nondiscrimination provisions of the Act, for that matter),
by providing reasons for adverse action that are either insufficiently specific or proxies for illegal discrimination, face potential administrative
sanctions,3 1 civil liability,3 and declaratory action.3S
24 For clarification, this Comment will use "ECOA" to refer to the 1974 act and 1976 amendments, collectively.
25 42 Fed Reg 1242 (1977), codified at 12 CFR § 202 (1999). In 1985, the FRB revised Regulation B, 50 Fed Reg 48018 (1985), and issued the Official Staff Commentary to Regulation B, which
replaces all previous FRB interpretation of the ECOA. 12 CFR § 202 Supp I.
26 15 USC § 1691b(a)(1) (1994) requires the Federal Reserve Board to implement regulations
that give effect to the ECOA.
27
12 CFR § 202 Supp I. See discussion in Part II.B.
28 15 USC § 1691(a).These provisions embody the substantive anti-discrimination provisions
of the ECOA and may be contrasted with the procedural reporting requirements discussed below.
29 15 USC § 1691(a). See also Regulation B, 12 CFR §§ 202.2(z), 202.4.
30 12 CFR § 202.5.
31 12 CFR § 202.6.
32 12 CFR § 202.9; 15 USC § 1691(d) ("Each applicant against whom adverse action is taken
shall be entitled to a statement of reasons for such action from the creditor.... A statement of reasons meets the requirements of this section only if it contains the specific reasons for the adverse
action taken.") (emphasis added).
Other ECOA requirements, beyond the scope of this discussion, include mandatory notice of
an applicant's right to request a copy of any appraisal on the applicant's home, 12 CFR § 202.5a,
limits on when a creditor may require a spouse as a cosigner on a loan, 12 CFR § 202.7(d), restrictions on when an existing credit account may be closed, 12 CFR § 202.7(c), and restrictions on the
way creditors report information to credit reporting agencies, 12 CFR § 202.10(b).
33 15 USC § 1691c; 12 CFR § 202.14(a).
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C. The ECOA's Reporting Requirement Could Facilitate
Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act
1. The Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 already

prohibit housing discrimination.
Many consider the Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA") the tenant's
primary weapon for fending off discrimination by prospective landlords."
The FHA prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing." An
FHA claim involves a three-step inquiry First, to make out a prima facie
case, a plaintiff need only show that she is a member of a statutorily protected class who applied for and was qualified to rent housing and that
her application was denied while the dwelling remained available."O Second, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant may defeat

the claim by showing that his decision to deny the plaintiffs application
was based on permissible considerations." Third and finally, if the defen-

34 15 USC § 1691e(a)-(d) (stating that defendants violating the ECOA are liable for attorney's
fees as well as compensatory and punitive damages up to $10,000 or $500,000 in a class action); 12
CFR § 202.14(b)(1).
35 15 USC § 1691(c); 12 CFR § 202.14(b)(1).
36 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,42 USC §§ 3601-3619,3631 (1994 & Supp 111996).
37 Kushner, 42 Vand L Rev at 1096 (cited in note 7) ("Title VIII [is] the most attractive litigation strategy. All fair housing cases should now be brought under Title VIII."). But see Ware, 7
Admin L J Am U at 62 (cited in note 7) (stating "the records of the federal agencies responsible for
fair housing enforcement have been dismal").
38 The FHA states, in relevant part,

it shall be unlawful-(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of; or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. (b) To discriminate against any person [who is a member of one of the above listed groups] in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.
42 USC § 3604. For a comparison of administrative enforcement mechanisms of the FHA and
ECOA, see Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair
Housingand Lending Law, andthe AntidiscriminationPrinciple,47 Emory L J 409,411-12 (1998)
(noting that the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban Development
apply a more rigorous standard than other agencies).
39 But see Mahoney, 47 Emory L J at 411 (cited in note 38) (arguing that, especially in the case
of "disparate impact" claims under the FHA,the standard for liability is "sketchy and haphazard").
40 A plaintiff need only show discriminatory effect, not discriminatory motive, to make out a
prima facie FHA case. Soules v United States DepartmentofHousing & UrbanDevelopment, 967 F2d
817,822 (2d Cir 1992) ("To make out a prima facie ... case, a plaintiff must show that he is a member
of a statutorily protected class who applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase housing and
was rejected although the housing remained available."). See also UnitedStates v Yonkers Boardof
Education,837 F2d 1181,1217 (2d Cir 1987) (To state a claim under the FHA, a plaintiff need allege
"only discriminatory effect, and need not show that the decision complained of was made with discriminatory intent."); Kushner, 42 Vand L Rev at 1074 (cited in note 7) ("[W]hen a single plaintiff
claims a housing denial without regard to a policy or pattern, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case by proof of disparate treatment, typically a denial to an eligible minority applicant followed by
a subsequent transfer to another party or the continued availability of the dwelling in the market.")
(footnote omitted).
41 Soules, 967 F2d at 822.
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dant provides evidence showing that his decision was motivated by permissible considerations, the plaintiff has an opportunity to show that the

stated reasons are merely a pretext for prohibited discrimination.42
Much like the FHA, its predecessor, the CRA,' 3 prohibits certain

forms of housing discrimination." The CRA states, in relevant part, "[a]ll
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,

lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. '4 5 The CRA applies to a broader range of parties in that it does not include the exemptions contained in the FHA.4 However, the CRA may also require proof
of intentional or purposeful discrimination to establish a prima facie case,
unlike the FHA.47

42
43

Id.

45

42 USC § 1982.

Act of April 9,1866,14 Stat 27, codified in part at 42 USC § 1982 (1994).
44 The CRA prohibits denial of the opportunity to purchase a given home based solely on race.
Hurd v Hodge,334 US 24,34 (1948) (holding that enforcement of racially restrictive covenants denies black purchasers "the same right 'as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,"' and, as such, violates the CRA) (quoting the
CRA). See also Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co, 392 US 409,413 (1968) (noting that the CRA bars racial
discrimination, both private and public, in the sale or rental of housing). For a discussion of the revival of Section 1982, see Geri J. Yonover, Comment, Dead End Street Discrimination,the Thirteenth
Amendment and Section 1982: City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 US. 100 (1981), 58 Chi Kent L Rev
873,875-76 (1982).
See Jones,392 US at 413 (noting that the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibits all racial discrimination, both public and private, in the sale or rental of housing). Unlike the CRA, Section
3603(b)(1)-(2) of the FHA provides a limited exemption for "any single-family house sold or rented
by an owner" or "rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be
occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually
maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence." 42 USC § 3603(b). Similarly, the
FHA provides a limited exception for religious organizations and private clubs, and provides an
exemption to prohibitions on discrimination based on familial status for housing for older persons.
42 USC § 3607.
Unlike the FHA, the CRA contains no limitation on punitive damages. See Phillips v Hunter
Trails Community Association,685 F2d 184,191 (7th Cir 1982) (holding that punitive damages under
Section 1982 are unlimited, even if the FHA is also violated); Davis v The Mansards,597 F Supp 334,
347 (N D Ind 1984) (evaluating punitive damage amount without discussing a statutory limit). See
also Richard A. Di Lisi, Note, Justice White Mixes More Than Just Colorto Createa New Shade of
RacialProtection,39 Case W Res L Rev 1343,1364 (1989) ("Section 1982 is [] considered substantially broader in its protection than the Fair Housing Act of 1968.").
47 Whether discriminatory intent (specifically, racial animus) is an element of a prima facie Section 1982 claim remains unclear. Compare City of Memphis v Greene, 451 US 100,131,135 (1981)
(White concurring) ("Purposeful racial discrimination is quite clearly the focus" of Section 1982 and
therefore a prima facie case requires a showing of racial animus.), with subsequent federal district
court decisions such as Davis, 597 F Supp at 345 ("A prima facie case of housing discrimination
under both the Fair Housing Act and the 1866 Civil Rights Act consists of the [same elements]."),
and Normal v Saint Louis Concrete Pipe Co, 447 F Supp 624,629 (E D Mo 1978) ("[T]he effect,
rather than the motivation, of a housing practice is the touchstone in examining the conduct of the
defendants" under both the FHA and the CRA.), and Smith v Anchor Building Corp,536 F2d 231,
233 (8th Cir 1976) ("Effect, not motivation, is the touchstone" of both the FHA and section 1982.).
46
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2. The reporting requirement could prevent landlords from
evading the FHA and CRA.

The ECOA states, "Within thirty days (or such longer reasonable
time as specified in regulations of the Board [of Governors of the Federal

Reserve] for any class of credit transaction) after receipt of a completed
application for credit, a creditor shall notify the applicant of its action on

the application." More importantly, an "applicant against whom adverse
action is taken" is "entitled to a statement of reasons for such action
from the creditor. 4 1 This statement of reasons must be specific enough
to notify the consumer of the exact deficiencies in his credit application
and how he could have met the creditor's terms. °
Without the ECOA's reporting requirement, a landlord could discriminate against applicants of a certain race and hide behind the excuse
of bad credit without even running the credit check. If the ECOA applied
to leases of real property, it would force landlords to be more accountable by requiring them to explain the exact reasons for their adverse action. 1 In this way, the ECOA could add teeth to both the FHA3 and the
CRA by preventing landlords from using the pretext of bad credit to disguise discrimination.

In addition, the ECOA's reporting requirement would provide tenants with useful information needed to combat discrimination through
lawsuits under the FHA and CRA.5 Such information might not other15 USC § 1691(d)(1).
15 USC § 1691(d)(2).
15 USC § 1691(d)(3) ("A statement of reasons meets the requirements of this section only
if it contains the specific reasonsfor the adverse action taken.") (emphasis added). See Fischlv GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp, 708 F2d 143,148 (5th Cir 1983) (holding that "credit references are
insufficient" does not fulfill the notice requirement because it does not provide enough information
for the consumer to remedy the problem); Carrollv Exxon Co,434 F Supp 557,562 (E D La 1977)
(holding that the statement "Credit Bureau which had been contacted could furnish little or no
definitive information" regarding the applicant's credit history did not fulfill the notice requirement).
51 Effective enforcement of the FHA is particularly important if we take congressional intent
and the antidiscriminatory purpose of the FHA seriously. See Ware, 7 Admin L J Am U at 118 (cited
in note 7) ("If housing patterns are the result of choice without respect to race, a different and better
future will result. Congress recognized this when it enacted the original Fair Housing Act in 1968
....
When housing providers become aware of the severe economic consequences of their unlawful
conduct, they will have a considerable incentive to eliminate discriminatory practices. Effective enforcement is essential to obtain the result Congress intended.").
52 42 USC §§ 3601-3619.
53 The potential of the ECOA to reduce housing discrimination by preventing landlords from
dodging FHA claims distinguishes ECOA application to residential leases from application to commercial leases or leases for the sale of goods. More specifically, the substantive evils caused by housing discrimination might be more significant than the harms of discrimination in other economic
transactions. For this reason, society has more to potentially gain from improved FHA enforcement.
See Ware, 7 Admin L J Am U at 117 (cited in note 7) ("The elimination of segregated housing patterns would ameliorate many of the vexing problems of race relations that confront this nation.").
54
See Keest, 989 PLI/Corp at 571 (cited in note 18) (Credit discrimination statutes such as the
ECOA might be "[a] [s]leeping [gliant" providing "[flar-[r]eaching [r]emedies."). The ECOA is likely
to be increasingly important for a variety of reasons. First, the number of cases brought under the
48
49
50
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wise be accessible, because the ECOA is the only statute55 mandating disclosure of the specific reasons for a landlord's adverse action when he
rejects an applicant based on the applicant's credit report. ECOAmandated disclosure could provide plaintiffs with information relevant
to their prima facie case and the landlord's affirmative defense. First, dis-

closure of the reasons a plaintiff's credit report was insufficient may help
the plaintiff determine whether she has a viable claim in the first instance. A prima facie case under the FHA requires an initial showing that
the plaintiff is a member of a statutorily protected class otherwise qualified to rent a given dwelling.5 ECOA-mandated disclosure of the specific
reasons why a plaintiff's credit report was deemed deficient by the landlord would inform the plaintiff whether she was "otherwise qualified" to
rent the unit, or whether the plaintiff genuinely failed to meet some legitimate nondiscriminatory "creditworthiness" standard established by
the landlord. In other words, the reporting requirement would help determine whether the poor credit rating was just a pretextual justification
to deny the lease, the real reason presumably being the applicant's race
or some other impermissible categorization.

ECOA is increasing, because consumer attorneys are just beginning to see credit discrimination
statutes as an avenue to prosecute a host of abusive practices by creditors. Id at 572. Furthermore,
despite giving short shrift to the substantive antidiscrimination provisions of the ECOA, see Ian
Ayres, FairDriving: Genderand Race Discriminationin Retail CarNegotiations, 104 Harv L Rev 817
(1991) (noting that the antidiscrimination legislation is underenforced in areas of consumer lending
other than residential mortgages), the federal agencies charged with enforcing the ECOA have recently begun to enforce the statute more vigorously. See Mahoney, 47 Emory L J at 411-12 (cited in
note 38). This heightened enforcement of the ECOA, combined with renewed interest in FHA
prosecution, see id (noting that the DOJ and HUD have, in the last several years, adopted an "aggressive approach" to enforcement of the FHA), is particularly salient given that the focus of this
Comment is on the interaction of the two statutes and the ways in which the reporting requirement
of the ECOA might advantage private plaintiffs suing under the FHA.
While one could argue that current substantial compliance with the terms of the ECOA proves
that more vigorous enforcement holds limited potential for change, this claim is likely wrong. Farst,
the potential to apply the Act to a new class of defendants means that even if creditors currently
comply, this group of complying creditors might not include landlords. Second, while the reporting
requirement of the ECOA by itself is not likely to result in significant change, the information provided by ECOA-mandated disclosure is significant. It will provide plaintiffs with crucial ammunition
when attempting to counter landlord circumvention of statutorily granted rights proscribed elsewhere-the FHA and CRA being the two clearest examples. Third, despite the FRB's reluctance to
initiate actions for ECOA violations, see Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Heartand Phase Transitions:An Exploratory Study of Congressand Minority Interests,38 Wm & Mary L Rev 1729,1779
(1997) ("Federal agencies have infrequently initiated fair lending actions alleging violations of the
FHA/ECOA."), substantial evidence of creditor noncompliance exists. See, for example, Keest, 989
PLI/Corp at 572 (stating that there is evidence of creditors who fail to comply with the ECOA's
reporting requirement).
55
While the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires creditors to provide consumers with notification of an adverse action, 15 USC § 1681m, only the ECOA requires creditors to provide disappointed applicants with the "speciftc reasons for [the] adverse action." Fischl,708 F2d at 147 (emphasis added); 15 USC § 1691(d)(3). See also note 32 and accompanying text.
56
See note 40 and accompanying text.
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Second, ECOA-mandated disclosure could help plaintiffs determine
whether the landlord's justification for denying the lease is legitimate or
pretextual. 7 ECOA disclosure would require landlords seeking to deny
tenants' applications based on deficient credit to inform tenants about
the specific deficiencies of their credit reports. Such disclosure would inform the plaintiff-tenant about the strength and validity of the landlord's
insufficient credit defense. Information about the landlord's claim that
the plaintiff has insufficient credit is particularly critical to the plaintiff
arguing that the landlord's insufficient credit defense is mere pretext. The
fact that a pretext check can be met with a showing of objective evidence
indicating that the plaintiff was an unsuitable candidate for a lease' demonstrates that information elicited by the ECOA is relevant to the
strength of the landlord's affirmative defense. If the landlord has objective evidence that a specific element of the plaintiff's credit report did not
meet his lawful criteria, such evidence is likely to defeat the plaintiff's
case. The ECOA could place the burden of disclosure on the landlord
thereby giving the would-be plaintiff a valuable source of informationwhether the landlord has a viable affirmative defense or is simply trying
to evade the FHA with a pretextual "bad credit" excuse.
ECOA-mandated disclosure could prove to be even more critical for
plaintiffs suing under the CRA. While the CRA does not contain many
of the exceptions found in the FHA,'9 it arguably requires a showing of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.6 It may not be enough, under
the CRA, that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class and was denied a lease.61 Therefore, information elicited by the ECOA could prove
critical for the plaintiff suing under the CRA. If landlords are forced to
provide applicants with the specific reasons their credit report was deficient (assuming the applicant is denied based on a bad credit report),
then the would-be tenant will possess crucial information-whether the
landlord's objections to the applicant's credit report appear reasonableneeded to decide whether to bring a lawsuit. Arguably, in a world where
the landlord does not have to provide such information, the landlord can
use insufficient credit as a pretext for all sorts of prohibited discrimination (race, sex, marital status, and so on) by claiming the denial is based
on the applicant's credit report but leaving the tenant, often with defi-

See Part I.C.1 (discussing the mandates of the FHA).
Although the court may be skeptical of a defendant's subjective reasons for denying the
plaintiff's application, "objective evidence indicating that truth lies behind his assertions of nondiscriminatory conduct" may pass the FHA's pretext check and result in a verdict for the defendant.
See, for example, Soules v United States Departmentof Housing & Urban Development,967 F2d 817,
822 (2d Cir 1992).
59 See note 46.
60 See note 47.
61 See note 47.
57
58

2000]

ECOA and Housing Leases

cient resources and expertise, in the dark as to exactly what was insufficient about his credit.6
II. APPLICATION OFTHE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
TO LEASES

The scope of the ECOA's protections and prohibitions appears
broad.6 With certain limited exceptions enumerated in the text and im-

plementing regulations, any applicant for credit may sue a creditor for
violating the terms of the Act. It is unclear, however, whether ECOA
prohibitions apply to landlords leasing residential property.' The
ECOA's reporting requirement applies to "creditors" receiving "application[s] for credit."'' Thus, the ECOA applies to landlords leasing property
ift under the terms of the ECOA, a landlord is a "creditor." This turns on
whether a lease constitutes deferred payment of debt, the necessary element of a credit transaction under the ECOA. This Part explores the text,
agency interpretation, and case law surrounding the ECOA to determine

whether any of these sources provide a dispositive answer to this question.
A. The Text of the Act
While there is often dispute over the weight that one should give to
the myriad sources available to ascertain the meaning of a statute, few
would disagree that the starting point is the text.6 The ECOA's reporting
62 It is possible, of course, that legal reforms making it more difficult for landlords to use poor
credit as a pretext for discrimination will simply cause landlords to shift to other pretextual justifications. Not all landlords will shift, however, and strengthening protections against discrimination
would nevertheless be justified, since application of the ECOA will raise the costs of discrimination
for those who continue to discriminate.
63 See 12 CFR § 202.1 ("The purpose of this regulation is to promote the availability of credit
to all creditworthy applicants without regard to [prohibited factors]."). See also Brothers v First
Leasing, 724 F2d 789,793-94 (9th Cir 1984) (noting the "overriding national policy against discrimination that underlies the Act" and claiming "[t]he ECOA is simply one more tool to be used in our
vigorous national effort to eradicate invidious discrimination").
64 For a limited discussion of the ECOA's application to residential leases, see Kim JohnsonSpratt, Note, Housing DiscriminationandSource of Income'A Tenant's Losing Battle, 32 Ind L Rev
457,462,465 (1999) (arguing that "[t]enants receiving Section 8 [of the Low-Income Housing Act]
assistance or TANF [Temporary Assistance for Needy Families] ...
can find limited protection under
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act" but concluding that the ECOA's protections are "not broad
enough to deal with the private rental housing sector").
While the ECOA clearly prohibits discrimination based on "receipt of public assistance," 15
USC §1691(a)(2), it does not explicitly address whether its protections are triggered in the context
of a lease application. At present, however, the FHA and the ECOA "usually are linked only in cases
against lenders or other creditors involving residential real estate, usually mortgages" and "FHA
claims routinely are joined with claims under the ECOA in any case involving a 'creditor' as the term
is broadly defined in the ECOA." Mahoney, 47 Emory L J at 416 n 30,447 (cited in note 38).
65 15 USC § 1691(d).
66 See, for example, Liberty Leasing Co v Machamer,6 F Supp 2d 714,716 (SD Ohio 1998)
(beginning ECOA analysis by quoting the text of the act). See also Estate of Cowartv Nicklos Drill-
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requirement applies to "creditors" receiving "application[s] for credit."
The ECOA defines "creditor" as "any person who regularly extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original
creditor who participates in the decision to extend, renew, or continue
credit."6 7
More centrally, the statute defines "credit" as "the right granted by
a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debts and defer its payment or to purchase property or services and defer payment
therefor."'' This definition is central to the Comment-whether the
ECOA applies to leases turns on whether a lease falls within this definia lease is "credit" only if it intion. Thus, by the wording of the statute,
69
volves "defer[ed] payment of debt.,
The preceding argument must be weighed against the fact that Congress may have struck the appropriate balance by excluding leases from
ECOA coverage. Because the text of the ECOA makes no mention of
leases when it speaks of credit transactions, we might think the act was
not intended to include leases. If Congress intended to cover such a
broad category of transactions, it would have used a term more explicit
than "credit., 70 In other instances, Congress has regulated leases by explicitly including them within a legislative scheme.71 Furthermore, leases
are often considered distinct from credit,7 even mutually exclusive with
credit," thus rendering an interpretation that automatically folds all
leases into the ECOA's definition of credit questionable.

ing Co, 505 US 469,475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the
language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the
statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished."); Chevron USA, Inc
v National Resources Defense Counci4 Inc, 467 US 837, 842-43 (1984) ("Statutory construction
begins and ends with the text of a statute if the meaning of that text is clear."). For arguments in
favor of text as the starting point (and ending point) of statutory interpretation, see Antonin Scalia,
A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 16,18,29-37 (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed) (stating that one "generally accepted concrete rule[ ] of statutory construction ... [is] that
when the text of a statute is clear, that is the end of the matter"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 Harv J L & Pub Pol 87 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533 (1983).
67 15 USC § 1691a(e). Commentators regard the ECOA's definition of "creditor" as broad.
See, for example, Mahoney, 47 Emory L J at 447 (cited in note 38).
68 15 USC § 1691a(d).
69

Id.

See Brothers v FirstLeasing,724 F2d 789,798 (9th Cir 1984) (Canby dissenting) (noting that
while applying the ECOA to leases might advance the highly desirable goal of ending discrimination,
it is "impossible to accept the proposition that Congress, by its silence in passing the Consumer
Leasing Act or amending the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1976, somehow expanded the latter
Act to a coverage far beyond that accorded to leases under any provisions it had thus far enacted").
71 See, for example, 15 USC § 1667 (1994) (Governing "consumer leases" explicitly).
72 See note 64.
73 See text accompanying note 126.
70
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The text is not, however, dispositive of whether leases should categorically be defined as credit,7' as is amply demonstrated by the conflicting case law concerning attempts to answer this very question.75 While the
ECOA's definition of credit is clear, whether, or to what extent, it includes leases is ambiguous.
B.

Agency Interpretation

The FRB is required to promulgate implementing regulations that
interpret and give effect to the ECOA.76 Both the original ECOA and the

1976 Amendments are implemented by Regulation B,7 first adopted by
the FRB in 1977. While the weight such agency interpretation should
carry is unsettled, agency interpretation is clearly relevant.78
74 A debate over this same issue-the definition of credit and its intersection with leases-exists in the context of the sale of goods. See, for example, John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of the
Sale/Lease Distinction,68 Iowa L Rev 667 (1983) (arguing that there is no stable distinction between
lease and sale). See also Peter E Coogan, Is There a Difference Between a Long-Term Lease and an
Installment Sale of Personal Property?56 NYU L Rev 1036 (1981) (arguing that the long-term
lease/installment sale distinction should still be drawn, albeit in fewer contexts).
The debate over whether a given transaction falls within the scope of UCC Article 9 and therefore can invoke its consumer protections is similar to the ECOA debate. To benefit from UCC Article 9, consumers attempt to characterize transactions as sales subject to security interest rather than
leases since Article 9 covers security interests, not leases. See Eligio Pimentel, Renting-to-Own:Exploitation or Market Efficiency?, 13 L & Ineq J 369,375-76 (1995) (discussing the lease versus security interest debate that arises when consumers attempt to invoke Article 9). The 1990 UCC revisions
resolve the security interest versus lease categorization based on the objective characteristics of the
transaction, not the subjective intent of the contracting parties. The drafters of the revisions failed
to eliminate all
references to the subjective intent of the parties. See Pimentel, 13 L & Ineq J at 376,
citing UCC § 1-201, Official Comment 37 (1994) (noting that "a transaction creates a security interest
if the lessee has an obligation to continue paying consideration for the term of the lease, if the obligation is not terminable by the lessee ... and if one of four additional [economic] tests is met").
Even if the UCC could reasonably be applied by analogy, such arguments are of questionable
relevance because they center on the UCC's definitions which do not intersect with the definition
of "credit" contained in the ECOA. See UCC § 1-201(37) (1995) (defining "security interest" and
recognizing the distinction between lease and credit/sale). But see Ayer, 68 Iowa L Rev at 668 n 10
(noting that "most of the examples [in the article] concern personal property because most sale/lease
case law involves personal property. But in principle there is no reason why the same argument
[against the sale/lease distinction] cannot apply just as well to real property leasing."). Furthermore,
given the confusion surrounding the UCC's definitions, it is unclear that they could be of any help.
See Pimentel, 13 L & Ineq Jat 376 ("[C]ircumstances under which a security interest is created [under the UCC] remain ambiguous" in part because of severe definitional inconsistency between UCC
§ 1-201 and § 9-102.). Because this Comment takes the ECOA's credit definition as a given, arguments related to other ways to define the term are beyond this Comment's scope.
75
See Part II.C (discussing conflicting case law concerning whether leases constitute "credit"
within the meaning of the ECOA).
76 15 USC § 1691b(a)(1).
77 42 Fed Reg 1242 (1977), revised by 50 Fed Reg 48018 (1985), codified at 12 CFR § 202
(1999).
78
Compare Chevron USA, Inc v NaturalResources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that courts should adopt a two-step approach, asking first whether Congress specifically addressed the interpretive question and second whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable), with K Mart Corp v Cartier,Inc,486 US 281,292-93 n 4 (1988) (limiting step one of the Chevron analysis to considering whether the statutory text specifically addresses the interpretive question
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Similar to the ECOA, Regulation B defines "creditor," in relevant
part, as "a person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in the decision of whether or not to extend credit., 7' Regulation
B defines a "credit transaction" as "every aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor regarding an application for credit or an existing extension of credit (including, but not limited to, information requirements;
investigation procedures; standards of creditworthiness; terms of credit;
furnishing of credit information; revocation, alteration, or termination of
credit; and collection procedures)." Unfortunately, this definition is derivative of the definition of "credit" -it focuses on the "transaction" aspect of the term "credit transaction" but fails to shed much light on the
meaning of "credit."
Consistent with the text of the ECOA, Regulation B defines
"credit" as "the right granted by a creditor to an applicant to defer payment of a debt, incur debt and defer its payment, or purchase property
or services and defer payment therefor."" The Official Staff Commentary
on Regulation B's definition of "credit" states:
Regulation B covers a wider range of credit transactions than
Regulation Z (Truth in Lending). For purposes of Regulation B a
transaction is credit if there is a right to defer payment of a debt regardless of whether the credit is for personal or commercial purposes, the number of installments required for repayment, or
whether the transaction is subject to finance charge."
Thus, both the text of the ECOA and Regulation B state that deferred
payment is the essential element of "credit."
Despite this agreement on the definition of credit, the 1985 Board
of Governors for the FRB has explicitly stated that the ECOA should
not be construed to cover leases. In issuing its revision to Regulation B
under ECOA, the Board provided supplementary information concerning its interpretation of the regulation. This supplementary information
is entitled to less judicial deference than an FRB regulation." The Board

and refusing to consider legislative history).
79 12 CFR § 202.2(1).
80 12 CFR § 202.2(m).
81 12 CFR § 202.20).
82 Official Staff Interpretation of § 202.20) of Regulation B, 12 CFR § 202 Supp I.
83 Regardless of whether an official FRB interpretation is on equal footing with a regulation,
supplementary information, much like a statement of purpose published at the beginning of a statute,
should not be accorded the same deference as a regulation. The FRB concedes that "[t]he [Official
Staff] Commentary replaces" all previous Board interpretation of the ECOA and that "[t]he commentary is the means by which [the Board] issues official staff interpretations of Regulation B." 12
CFR § 202, Appendix D (1999). Furthermore, the Board stated that after considering application of
the ECOA to leases, "no changes [to Regulation B] resulted." 12 CFR § 202, Supplementary Information. In fact, the Board reasserted its broad definition of credit. The Board should not be able to
make rules that are equally binding as regulations without actually regulating.
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of Governors noted that "the Ninth Circuit interpreted the ECOA's
definition of credit too broadly when it concluded in the Brothers case
... that ... a lease is an extension of credit. The Congress has consistently
viewed lease and credit transactions as distinct and mutually exclusive."'
Given the clear definition of credit," this agency interpretation, in direct
response to a case suggesting that all leases are credit transactions, suggests that the Board of Governors did not think that leases could categorically be described as credit transactions, despite the statute's all-

inclusive language. Even if agency interpretation and congressional intent are entitled to significant deference, however, the clear text defining

credit still controls.8 If under state (or federal) law a given lease transaction necessarily involves deferred payment, courts should be hardpressed to conclude such leases are not credit transactions within the
scope of the ECOA.

C. Judicial Precedent
The relevant case law, consistent with text and agency interpretation, holds that deferred payment is a necessary element of "credit" according to the ECOA's definition.! The element of deferred payment
appears sufficient to render a transaction "credit" under the terms of the
ECOA-"any deferral of payment, such as payment for services a week
after the services are provided" can categorize a transaction as "credit"
12 CFR § 202 Supplementary Information (1985).
85 See Brothers v FirstLeasing, 724 F2d 789,793 (9th Cir 1984) (construing the "literal language of the ECOA," in light of the Act's antidiscriminatory purpose, as dispositive of the issue of
whether credit transactions include leases).
86 The broad coverage of the ECOA is confirmed by the FRB's statement that "[tihe purpose
of this regulation is to promote the availability of credit to all creditworthy applicants." 12 CFR
§ 202.1(b) (1999). Such a broad statement of purpose seems in tension with the Board's limiting
interpretation of "credit."
87 The first part of the Chevron test is to ask whether Congress specifically addressed the interpretive question. 467 US at 842. The agency is not entitled to deference if the statutory text answers the question or the agency interpretation is not "reasonable." Id at 842-43. See also K Mart,
486 US at 292-93 & n 4 (limiting the first step of the Chevron inquiry to the statutory text). We might
think the Board's interpretation is unreasonable on the grounds that it fails to even consider the
possible application of state law or to determine whether given leases may meet the definition of
credit contained in the statute.
Furthermore, the degree of deference due to the FRB's supplementary information (which is
neither part of the official staff interpretation nor the regulatory text) under Chevron is unclear even
if deference to agency regulations and official interpretation is significant.
88 See Parts II.A and II.B.
89 See Williams v AT & T Wireless Services, Inc, 5 F Supp 2d 1142,1145 (W D Wash 1998)
(holding that ECOA governs sale of cellular telephone service because "the transaction involves the
purchase of services and deferral of payment for those services"); Dunn v American Express Co, 529
F Supp 633,634 (D Colo 1982) (finding that an application for an automatic teller machine card is
not a credit transaction under the ECOA because there is no "right to defer the payment of any
debt"); Butler v CapitolFederalSavings, 904 F Supp 1230,1234 (D Kan 1995) (finding that opening
a savings account is not a credit transaction because it does not involve the right to defer payment
of a debt).
84
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under the terms of the Act.90 Even though a lease may not primarily provide credit, any deferral is arguably sufficient to qualify a lease as credit.
Regardless of whether deferred payment is sufficient to categorize a
transaction as credit, it is clearly a necessary element. Transactions that
do not involve any deferral of payment fall outside the scope of the
ECOA's definition of credit and are thus beyond the Act's coverage.
Because the Supreme Court has not settled the issue of whether the
ECOA's definition of credit encompasses residential leases, there is no
clear nationwide rule governing the issue. A well developed body of case
law interpreting the relevant provision of the ECOA does not exist, since
"credit discrimination laws are only now beginning to be utilized aggressively" and in the 1980s "only a small number of ECOA cases were
brought each year."" Given the dearth of case law on point,9 this Comment looks to cases dealing with non-housing leases as relevant to
whether housing leases ought to be considered credit under the ECOA.
The case law presents examples of approaches courts have taken to the
issue of leases as credit under the ECOA rather than an indicator of what
the law is (given the lack of stable consistent precedent). A survey of the
case law, however, yields a numeric trend in favor of categorizing leases
as credit as defined by the ECOA.
1. Cases holding that the ECOA applies to leases.
The only case directly considering whether a real property lease
constitutes credit (deferred payment) under the ECOA is Ferguson v
Park City Mobile Homes,93 a federal district court case. In Ferguson,the
plaintiff sued an owner of mobile home lots who refused, allegedly in
violation of the antidiscrimination provisions of the ECOA, to lease him
a plot of land.9' The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under the ECOA, arguing that the ECOA does not apply to leases
of real property." The district court held that "[t]he language of the
ECOA is certainly broad enough to cover the lease of a mobile home
lot"9 given that "the term 'credit transaction,' as used in the ECOA, has
always been broad enough to allow for consumer lease transactions to be
included in its definition." The district court went on to state "any lease
to be paid in installments is a credit transaction, since the willingness of

90 Keest, 989 PLI/Corp at 575 (cited in note 18).
91 Id at 572.
92 See Ferguson v Park City Mobile Homes, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010, *5 (N D Ill) (noting
that there exists "a dearth of authority regarding whether a lease transaction for a mobile home lot
was intended to be subsumed by the ECOA's definition of credit").
93 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010 (N D Ill) (applying Illinois law).
94 Id at *2-4.
95 Id at *2.
96 Id at *6-7.
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the lessor to defer payments over the life of the lease depends upon the
perceived creditworthiness of the lessee.""7 According to this rationale,
courts should consider almost any property lease a credit transaction because periodic payments throughout the duration of the lease are an
element common to most leases.9
Courts have also held leases of personal property to be credit transactions. The Ninth Circuit, in Brothers v First Leasing,9 ruled that the
ECOA applies in the context of automobile leases. The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that any lease falls within the ECOA's definition of "credit" as
"defer[red] payment of debt" because a lease involves the exchange of
property in return for payment made in installments.'° Adopting the
Ninth Circuit's logic, we would similarly categorize all housing leases as
credit because they too involve the exchange of property (or the right to
possess the dwelling in the case of the residential lease) in return for
payment made in installments. '
Most recently, a district court in Williams v AT & T Wireless Services,
Inc,'*2 held that a consumer's application to purchase cellular telephone
service was a "credit transaction" under the ECOA because "the transaction involves the purchase of services and deferral of payment for those
services."'0 3 Although this case does not address the issue of whether a
lease is a credit transaction, it does support a significantly widened definition of credit by eliminating the requirement that the transaction involve
deferred debt.
The Williams court distinguished Shaumyan v Sidetex Co,"" a Second
Circuit decision, which held that a transaction involving payments "substantially contemporaneous" with performance is not a credit transaction,' on two grounds.'" First, the plaintiffs in Shaumyan prepaid for the
services they received. 7 Second, the transaction in Shaumyan, unlike the
transaction in Williams, "did not involve an assessment of the creditwor-

97

Id at *8. While this language comes from the court's discussion of the FCRA, the court ex-

plicitly broadened its claim by stating leases paid in installments are credit "[als
an economic matter." Id.
98 Because residential leases are often for a one-year term and because a tenant is rarely willing or able to pay for the entire year's rent in one lump sum, the lease most often provides for lease

payments on a monthly basis. See, for example, Sanford Kahn, American Legal Forms No 104, Chicago Apartment Lease (unfurnished) (1981, revised Jan 1995), a standard form lease with a field for
"monthly rent."
99 724 F2d 789,793 (9th Cir 1984).
100Id at 792-93 n 8.
101 Id.
102 5 F Supp 2d 1142 (W D Wash 1998).
103

Id at 1145.

900 F2d 16 (2d Cir 1990).
105 Id at 18.
106 5 F Supp 2d at 1146.
107 900 F2d at 17.
104
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thiness of the plaintiffs.""' According to the district court in Williams,
deferred payment (even if not "debt") and an assessment of the applicant's creditworthiness both act as plus factors in favor of categorizing a
transaction as "credit" under the ECOA. On this view, a housing lease
appears to be a credit transaction-tenants lease property for a fixed
term,"' deferring payment for the entire term by making payments in
installments, and landlords, especially those utilizing credit reports, make
an assessment of applicants' creditworthiness.
2. Cases holding that the ECOA does not apply to leases.
While the trend seems to favor categorizing most leases as credit
transactions within the reach of the ECOA, the reasoning in cases such
as Brothers'" and Ferguson"' has, on occasion, been sharply criticized.
Liberty Leasing Co v Machamer,11 a district court decision, is a good example. The district court in Liberty Leasing held that a lease is not covered by the ECOA because it is a transaction involving payment for contemporaneous use, not a "deferred debt." 3 The case involved a defendant who defaulted on a lease for automobile service equipment."' When
the plaintiff sued to recover the outstanding balance on the lease, the
defendant argued the lease was void under the ECOA.' ' The validity of
this defense
turned on whether the ECOA applied to leases in the first
6
place. 1
The district court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Brothers' 7 that, as a matter of law, a lease obligation was a "credit" transaction as defined by the ECOA.' '° Rather, the district court looked to the
terms of the lease agreement to determine whether the lease was a deferred debt within the meaning of the ECOA or payment in advance for
contemporaneous use."9 The district court reasoned that a lease containing terms allowing the lessee to surrender possession and avoid liability
for the entire outstanding balance of the lease was not a credit transaction since payment is not being deferred if surrender of the equipment
extinguishes liability under the lease agreement."" The district court ex-

108 5 F Supp 2d at 1146.
109 A tenancy at will being a counterexample.

110 724 F2d 789.
111 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010.
112 6 F Supp 2d 714 (S D Ohio 1998).
113
114

Id at 717-18.
Id at 716.

115 Id at 716-17.
116 Id at 717.
117

724 F2d 789.

118 6 F Supp 2d at 718.
119Id at 717.
120

Id.
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plained: "The relevant inquiry is whether the incrementalpayments constitute a contemporaneousexchange of considerationfor the possession of
the leased goods.' ' 1 Where the leasing agreement, or applicable law, provides for such a contemporaneous exchange, then the lessee cannot be
said to "defer [the] payment of [a] debt" within the meaning of the
ECOA. 2
The district court further argued that the Uniform Commercial
Code prohibits the lessor from maintaining an action for the full amount
of unpaid rent when the lessee has surrendered possession-evidence
that, legally, an equipment lease could not be a deferred debt within the
meaning of the ECOA. ' 2 On this logic, a property lease is a credit transaction only to the extent that surrender of the leased property does not
extinguish the parties' liability under the lease. In other words, it is not
the lease qua lease that controls the categorization, it is the surrounding
law defining the terms of the lease that determines whether the lease can
and does take on the necessary deferred debt characteristic.
The Liberty Leasing court also criticized the reasoning in Ferguson...
for overlooking the final rule promulgated by the 1985 Board of Governors for the FRB which explicitly states that the ECOA should not be
construed to cover leases.'2 The court noted:
[T]he Board of Governors expressly rejected the holding in Brothers that [the] ECOA was enacted to encompass lease transactions.
In issuing its interpretation of, and revisions to, Regulation B under
ECOA, which includes one of the definitions of "credit," the Board
of Governors said [that] . . . "the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
ECOA's definition of credit too broadly when it concluded in the
Brothers case that ... a lease is an extension of credit. The Congress
has consistently viewed lease and credit transactions as distinct and
mutually exclusive."'2 6
Because an agency's construction of regulations it is charged with enforcing is entitled to judicial deference,2 the district court in Liberty
Leasing concurred with the Board of Governors and held that the ECOA
does not apply to lease transactions.' This reasoning, however, overlooks
the definition of credit. Some leases do include deferred debt. Thus, following the reasoning of the Board of Governors without individualized
121

Id (citations omitted).
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Id.
Id at 717-18.
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1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010.
6 F Supp 2d at 718-19. See Part II.B.
126 Id at 719, quoting Regulation B, 12 CFR § 202 Supplementary Information. See text accompanying note 84.
127 See note 78 (discussing Chevron deference).
128 See Part II.B.
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consideration leads to conflicts with the text of the statute.9 Indeed, the
Liberty Leasing court implicitly acknowledged the validity of individualized lease categorization. If the FRB's position that leases are categorically excluded from ECOA coverage was controlling, then the court
would never have looked to the specific terms of the lease.
Finally, when analyzing the judicial dissensus on the applicability of
the ECOA to leases, it is important to consider the timing of the decisions. Given the dearth of precedent, this Comment treats cases spanning
the last two decades as relevant. While one might be tempted to explain
the drastically different outcomes based on intervening FRB commentary interpreting the ECOA's definition of credit,'" the only regulation
and accompanying commentary addressing the interpretation of "credit"
came after Brothers,but before Williams and Ferguson-allof which held
that credit includes leases under the ECOA. While relevant commentary
interpreting the ECOA plays a strong role in the Liberty Leasing opinion,31 it does not fully explain the court's divergence from precedent; the
rationale in cases such as Williams and Ferguson remained consistent
with Brothersdespite the intervening FRB commentary.
III. RESOLVING THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DILEMMA

In the context of real property leases, the real question is whether
relevant mandatory laws permit (or require) the lease to take on the
characteristic of deferred payment. From the landlord's perspective, a
lease, regardless of duration, is not an extension of credit so long as the
landlord can terminate the lease immediately upon non-payment by the
tenant. In this sense, the tenant making periodic payments owes no debt
to the landlord because the tenant has nothing more than the right to
possess the property for the time period for which she has already paid.
In contrast, if the landlord cannot force the tenant to surrender possession upon non-payment (which is the case in many jurisdictions. 2) then
the lease resembles credit to the extent that the lease agreement, as augmented by state law, gives the tenant a legal right to possess the property
for a period beyond which she has paid. This is the element of deferred
payment necessary to characterize a lease as credit.
The best answer to the question of whether a lease transaction constitutes credit (that is, whether the lease involves deferred payment of
debt) lies in the specific terms of the lease agreement. Similar to the approach applied to the lease of goods in Liberty Leasing,"' courts should
See note 78.
See Part II.B. See also the Brothers rationale discussed in Part II.C.1.
131 See text accompanying note 126.
132 See Part III.B.
133 See Part II.C.2. The Liberty Leasing court looked to the UCC as part of the relevant surrounding body of law to characterize a lease of goods. 6 F Supp 2d at 717-18. Similarly, courts should
129

130
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look at the text of the lease, as modified by any mandatory" state (or
federal) laws limiting the parties' ability to contract, when determining

whether a housing lease constitutes credit."
A determination focusing on the terms (both implicit and explicit)
of the housing lease will help to more accurately determine whether the
lease constitutes "credit" under the ECOA.

A. General Categorizations Are Overinclusive
Courts should use state law controlling the terms of the lease when
evaluating whether the lease constitutes "credit" as defined by the
ECOA. The reasoning in cases such as Brothers" and Ferguson'37 oversimplifies the inquiry surrounding the scope of the ECOA. '3 Mere payment in the form of installments does not render a lease a credit transaction unless the payments are made for a good or service already provided. Not all installment payments are deferred payments of debt. Rent-

to-own agreements 93 demonstrate this point. Rent-to-own contracts, in
which an individual rents a product, pays in installments and eventually
comes to own the product if a sufficient number of payments are made,"O
are traditionally considered lease transactions, not credit, despite the fact
that payments are made in installments.'
look to relevant landlord-tenant law to characterize residential leases.
134 Mandatory rules (laws), which are not waivable by the parties, should be distinguished from
default rules that the parties may contract around. These mandatory rules are as much a part of the
lease as the explicit terms of the lease agreement.
135 FRB Commentary on the intersection between the ECOA and state law notes that the Act
"alters, affects, or preempts only those state laws that are inconsistent with the act." 12 CFR § 202.11.
This provision does not control the issue of whether state laws constructing leases are relevant to
interpreting the ECOA because if state laws are relevant in this context, then they define the scope
of the Act as it applies to credit. In other words, if state laws requiring that leases involve deferred
payment expand the ECOA's scope, they could not be "inconsistent with the requirements of the
Act." Id.
136 724 F2d 789.
137 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010.
138 See text accompanying note 99. See also Brothers,724F2d at 797 (Canby dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion cannot be cabined and that "[i]f a lease is a 'credit transaction,' then
every lease, whether of personal property or real estate ...[is] covered by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. It is true that the majority has not said that such an expansion of coverage will follow
from their decision, but it certainly is compelled by its rationale.").
139 For a general discussion of the economics of rent-to-own agreements, see Pimentel, 13 L &
Ineq J at 369 (cited in note 74).
140 See James P.Nehf Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts,52 Ohio St L J 751,751-57
(1991). Rent to own contracts are also known as "lease purchases."
141 See Pimentel, 13 L & Ineq J at 370-71 (cited in note 74) (stating that most jurisdictions characterize rent-to-own contracts as leases, thereby allowing such contracts to evade most consumer
protection laws). But see Miller v Colortym, Inc,518 NW2d 544,548 (Minn 1994) (holding that rentto-own contracts are credit transactions "because buyers of goods are not required to make full
payment upon acquiring possession but are allowed to pay for goods sold over time").
The argument that characterizing rent-to-own contracts as leases allows sellers to evade consumer protection laws and take advantage of unwitting consumers is similar to the argument one
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The rent-to-own example illustrates the overinclusiveness of the
Brothers argument; installment payments do not turn a lease into a credit
transaction when the necessary element of deferred payment of debt is
missing.1 2 An additional element, that the lessee possess more than what
he pays for (the "debt" of deferred payment of debt), is necessary to
make a lease paid in installments a credit transaction. In other words, a
lease that is paid in installments, where the installment payments are
merely payments for contemporaneous use of the good and nothing
more, is not a credit transaction because the lessor is only providing the
lessee with the right to enjoy that which he has paid for to-date."
The argument in Ferguson,that a lease is a credit transaction if it
"depends upon the perceived creditworthiness of the lessee,'" is equally
overinclusive in the sense that it considers any transaction in which the
lessor is concerned about the creditworthiness of the lessee to be a credit
transaction. While a concern for creditworthiness often coincides with a
credit transaction, it is not a sufficient characteristic to make a transaction
credit. To hold otherwise would allow the subjective intent of the parties
to control the legal definition of the transaction without regard for the
objective nature of the relevant agreement. Furthermore, it would create
a situation in which a sale clearly involving no credit, like the purchase
of a good or real property with payment in cash, would constitute a credit
transaction based solely on the background worries of one of the parties
about the creditworthiness of the other.
Future courts should avoid the general categorizations made in,
cases such as Brothers and instead opt for an analysis focusing on the
mandatory law governing each lease, as well as on the explicit terms of
the lease. Courts should analyze the lease based on its specific terms in
order to determine whether the lessee has been allowed to defer payment to the lessor for possession of the property beyond that which the
lessee has already paid for.
Categorical determinations concerning the reach of the ECOA,
which assume the Act must cover all leases or no leases, fail to adequately consider the text of the Act. The ECOA's definition states that
transactions involving deferred payment of debt are credit and that credit
transactions are within the Act's scope. Because the ECOA sorts transactions based on a deferred credit criterion, a more nuanced analysis of
might advance with regard to characterizing housing leases as non-credit. Categorizing housing leases
as non-credit allows landlords to exploit unwitting lessees lacking resources (measured in terms of
time, money, interest, and ability) to determine whether denial of their rental application based on
"insufficient credit" is legitimate or pretext for illegal discrimination.
142 The element of deferred payment is necessary if for no other reason than because deferred
payment is the one thing that the text of the statute clearly requires.
143 In the residential context, lease payments are usually for the upcoming month-not the preceding month.
144 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010 at *8.
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leases is needed to be faithful to the text. Some leases involve deferred
payment, which means they meet the ECOA's definition and should be
covered by the Act. Furthermore, in order to determine which leases involve deferred payment, courts should look at the terms of the lease, as
the label "lease" is not determinative. State laws governing the terms of
leases may import elements of deferred debt into the transaction. Courts
should not turn a blind eye to state law as an important source for de-

termining whether a particular lease meets the statutory definition of
credit thereby bringing it within the reach of the ECOA.
B.

Lease Terms That Favor Categorizing the Lease as Credit: Some
Housing-Lease-Specific Guidelines

Assuming ambiguity on the issue of whether a particular lease is
considered credit, " courts should presume a given lease is or is not a
credit transaction based on the categorization applicable state laws favor
(or mandate). Whether a lease constitutes credit is a function of both the
explicit text of the lease and of the law governing the lease.

An example of a mandatory rule that may weigh in favor of characterizing a lease as a credit transaction is the rule preventing landlords
from evicting tenants upon nonpayment of rent. Eviction laws may favor
classifying leases as credit in instances where state law requires a landlord to provide tenants with continued possession, even in the absence
of rent payment, for a period beyond that which the tenant is required to

pay in advance."6 In these instances, where governing state law prevents
the landlord from evicting the tenant upon the tenant's failure to pay the
lease installment, the lease is a credit transaction in a very real sense. Not

only is the creditworthiness of the tenant a central issue in the lease
transaction," but, more concretely, the landlord is providing the tenant
See cases cited in Part II.C.
Given that most leases require the tenant to pay prospectively for the upcoming month, one
could argue that the relevant state law would have to enable the tenant to retain possession for more
than a month.
In most jurisdictions, forcible entry and detainer statutes provide the tenant with a nonwaivable
"right" to continue possession of the leased premises for a certain period of time, even if the tenant
fails to pay rent. The right is nonwaivable in the sense that the landlord and tenant cannot contract
around the statutory forcible entry and detainer procedures for eviction by permitting landlord selfhelp, for example. See 49 Am Jur 2d Landlord and Tenant § 997 & n 28 (1999); McCrory v Johnson,
to the ex296 Ark 231,755 SW2d 566,572 (1988) (holding a lease provision "illegal and invalid ....
tent it allowed self-help by [the] landlord"); Bass v Boetel & Co, 191 Neb 733,217 NW2d 804,807
(1974) (noting that "[sjelf-help, relating to the repossession of real estate, has long been contrary to
the public policy of Nebraska and is not to be condoned"); Thomas v Papadelis,16 Ohio App 3d 359,
476 NE2d 726,728 (1984) (holding that state forcible entry and detainer statute is the exclusive,
means by which a residential landlord may recover possession).
Agreements between landlord and tenant permitting landlord self-help in the case of nonpayment of rent may be void on a public policy rationale in instances where the state law does not otherwise provide for landlord self-help. See Restatement (Second) of Property § 14.2(2) (1977).
147 Recall that in Ferguson the creditworthiness of the applicant was a factor in categorizing a
145

146
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with a "right"'3 to occupy the dwelling for a time period extending beyond the time period for which the tenant is required to pay.149 In these
lease as a credit transaction. 1989 US Dist LEXIS 11010 at *8.
148 It may be more accurate to say that the tenant has an "ability" to retain possession because
the tenant's ability to retain possession is more of a negative right. We might characterize laws preventing immediate eviction as providing the tenant a right to not be removed by the landlord immediately as opposed to conferring a "right" to retain possession and simultaneously refuse to pay.
149 In most states, unlawful detainer statutes allow the delinquent tenant to retain possession
of the property for a certain period after she has received notice of delinquency. If the tenant pays
rent before this time period expires, the landlord may not evict the tenant. See 49 Am Jur 2d Landlord and Tenant § 1031 & n 4 (1999); Greenhill v Allen, 181 Ga App 532,352 SE2d 845,845 (1987)
(holding the tenant's late rent payment "presented a complete defense" to landlord's action for
possession); Bank ofBelleville v Stidimire,119 1ll App 3d 73,456 NE2d 175,178 (1983) (holding that
"the tenant must be given an opportunity to pay the delinquent rent before the lease may be terminated");Allen v FirstNationalBank of Commerce,440 S2d 172 (La App 1983) (affirming trial court
judgment in favor of the tenant on the grounds that the delinquent rent was paid before the filing
of eviction proceedings); Finley v Park Ten Associates, 441 NYS2d 475,476,83 AD2d 537,538 (NY
App Div 1981) ("Where a summary proceeding is bottomed upon violation of a substantial covenant
of the lease the proceeding may not be instituted until after the time to cure has expired."); Dang
v Cox Corp, 655 P2d 658,660 (Utah 1982) (concluding that the landlord's unlawful detainer claim
failed because the tenant paid the delinquent rent within three days of receiving notice); Housing
Authority of Everett v Terry, 114 Wash 2d 558,789 P2d 745,748 (1990) (tenant must be provided with
the option of complying with the terms of lease within 10 days of receiving notice or surrendering
the premises).
Similarly, if the landlord fails to allow the tenant to cure a delinquent rent payment (by paying
the amount due) during the statutory time period imported into the lease, then the landlord is barred
from bringing an action for possession (eviction) on the basis of that default. See 49 Am Jur 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 1031 & n 5 (1999); Norwalk Mall Venture v Mijo, Inc, 11 Conn App 360,527
A2d 1202,1206 (1987) ("[F]ailure of the plaintiff to allow the [tenant] defendant fifteen days to cure
the default... precluded its claim for possession on the basis of that default."); Tage II Corp v Ducas
(US) Realty Corp,17 Mass App 664,461 NE2d 1222,1225 (1984) (finding that tenant has thirty days
from the date of notice to comply with the terms of the lease and thereby avoid a successful action
for possession by the landlord).
Furthermore, if the delinquent tenant pays the amount due within the statutory cure period then
the landlord may not evict the tenant on the basis of the previously delinquent rent. See 49 Am Jur
Landlord and Tenant § 1031 & n 7; City of New Orleans v Cheramie,509 S2d 58,61-62 (La App 1987)
(affirming judgment against the landlord in an eviction proceeding when the tenant had made a
"good faith effort to cure their default within 30 days after being given notice of default"). Even once
summary eviction proceedings against the tenant have commenced, payment of the delinquent rent
will often constitute a sufficient cure, thereby staying the eviction proceeding. See 49 Am Jur 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 1031 & n 8; In re Telephonics Inc, 85 Bankr 312,316 (E D Pa 1988) ("[U]nder
applicable Pennsylvania law, a lease is not 'terminated' when the tenant fails to pay rent due until
the tenant is physically evicted, rather than upon the entry of a judgment for possession .... a tenant
retains a right to cure any rental delinquency and preserve the tenancy until the moment of actual
valid and complete eviction of the tenant.") (emphasis added); Johnson v Edgewood Management
Corp, 512 A2d 287,288 (DC App 1986) (A tenant may "redeem his tenancy," even after a judgment
for possession has been entered against him, by paying the delinquent rent, including interest and
other costs.); Omni Quip of Jacksonville, II, Inc v Milo, Inc, 542 S2d 477,478 (Fla App 1989) (trial
court abused its discretion by granting the landlord possession without allowing the tenant to pay
delinquent rent); Paul McCusker & Associates, Inc v Omodt, 359 NW2d 747,748 (Minn App 1985)
(tenant may be granted possession and continuation of the lease by paying the landlord delinquent
rent, "with interest and costs of the action," "at any time before possessionhas been delivered" to the
landlord) (quoting Minn Stat § 504.02 (1982)); French v Ester,749 SW2d 461,462 (Mo App 1988)
(Payment is a defense that is "equally available when payment is tendered after the date the judgment was originally entered by the associate circuit judge but before the trial de novo.").
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instances, the tenant is deferring payment to the landlord in the sense
that the tenant pays on a monthly basis but has the ability to cease pay-

ment and retain possession beyond the month for which he has paid.,'o
This ability to maintain possession, where it is legally required, means
that housing leases are credit transactions within the meaning of the

ECOA; they do not involve contemporaneous payment for possession
because state law requires that the lessee have the ability to maintain

possession beyond the time period for which he has paid."
C. Policy Arguments Concerning the Application of the ECOA
to Leases
1. Arguments favoring application of the ECOA.

Widespread housing discrimination, thoroughly documented by
solid empirical evidence,"2 justifies ECOA mandated disclosure in the
residential lease context. Such disclosure would further the ECOA's
150 Under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act § 4.201(b) (1985), the delinquent
tenant has fourteen days after receiving notice from the landlord (of delinquency and intent to terminate the lease) to pay rent in order to prevent the landlord from terminating the lease agreement.
When this fourteen-day grace period is imported into a lease agreement, the lease agreement appears to involve credit as the landlord has no choice but to allow the tenant to exercise her statutory
right and enjoy the property for two weeks without payment in advance.
151 The obvious rejoinder to this characterization, even in states that have mandatory rules preventing immediate eviction for failure to pay rent, is that the landlord may, and often does, require
a security deposit that covers the potential rent for this unpaid period in which he must wait to evict
the delinquent tenant. The relevance of this argument turns on state law governing housing leases
as well. For instance, is the landlord permitted to require a security deposit that is sufficient to cover
the window of time in which he must wait to evict the delinquent tenant? Furthermore, may the
landlord divert the delinquent tenant's security deposit to pay for the rent that the tenant has failed
to pay, or must the landlord attempt to secure this payment by other means? If the security deposit
serves only as security for damage to the apartment and may not be used to offset the balance owed
by the tenant for unpaid rent, then it does little to undermine the characterization of the lease as
credit. Of course, all of these arguments turn on the substantive content of relevant state and local
law. See, for example, Chicago Municipal Code Ch 5-12-080(d) (1990) (stating that landlord must
return security deposit but may deduct money for damages and unpaid rent).
Other examples of mandatory lease terms that might render a lease credit under the ECOA are
statutes allowing generous repair and deduct by tenants (forcing the landlord to allow tenants to
deduct rent payments). Even if such deductions turn out to be larger than needed repairs, such statutes position the landlord as a creditor in the sense that the tenant is allowed to deduct (possibly
incur a debt larger than the legitimate cost of repair) and defer payment until the landlord wins a
judgment stating that the deduction was exorbitant.
152 See notes 7 and 9.See also Jody David Armour,Affirmative Action:Diversity of Opinions:
Hype and Reality in Affirmative Action, 68 U Colo L Rev 1173,1177-78 (1997) (describing "evidence
of massive discrimination in housing markets and residential choice" and noting that undercover
investigations controlling for virtually all variables other than race and ethnicity demonstrate widespread housing discrimination); Florence Wagman Roisman, Book Review, The Lessons ofAmerican
Aparthei" The Necessity and Means of PromotingResidentialRacial Integration,81 Iowa L Rev 479,
496 (1995) ("HUD's 1989 National Housing Discrimination Study showed that discrimination continues to be widespread."); Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid:Segregation and the Making of the Underclass99-109 (Harvard 1993) (citing housing discrimination studies,
controlling for income, confirming rampant discrimination against blacks in housing rental).
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broad anti-discriminatory aim by targeting a massive and persistent
source of discrimination impacting the ECOA's protected class in a par-

ticularly destructive manner.'O Applying the ECOA to residential leases
may specifically benefit the persons the ECOA was designed to protect,

as they might be the very persons most likely to sign such leases." If the
ECOA's purpose is to protect those most likely to be discriminated

against when applying for credit, then housing leases that meet the
ECOA's definition of credit might be a good proxy for transactions un-

dertaken by this target population.15 The poor are more likely to resort
to leases, instead of mortgages, than the rich. The sheer cost of buying a
home combined with the real and perceived difficulties associated with
obtaining a mortgage mean that leases might be a reasonable proxy for
the less wealthy. Given that the legislative purpose of the ECOA was to

protect those for whom inability to obtain credit is an acute problem,'6
we might be pleased with an interpretation of the ECOA that provides

yet another protection to this target population."

Application of the ECOA to housing leases would alter the quantity

and quality of lawsuits brought by tenant-plaintiffs. Because disclosure
would better inform tenants by providing them with the reasons their
credit was insufficient, tenants would be more likely to bring meritorious
lawsuits. Some tenants in the status quo who have meritorious FHA
153 See note 15. Housing discrimination is uniquely harmful. The primary effect of housing discrimination, preventing minorities from living where they choose, see Michelle Adams, Separateand
Unequa"Housing Choice, Mobility and Equalizationin the Federally Subsidized Housing Program,
71 Tul L Rev 413,427-28 (1996) (noting that "[t]he ability to choose where to live... is linked to the
idea of freedom in the American popular imagination"), is inextricably linked to a host of devastating secondary effects, such as decreased access to good schools, exposure to unclean and unsafe
environmental conditions, and lack of access to employment. See Gary Orfield, Housing and the
Justificationof School Segregation, 143 U Pa L Rev 1397,1401 (1995) (schools); Robert D. Bullard,
EnvironmentalRacism and "Invisible" Communities,96 W Va L Rev 1037,1042 (1994) (environmental hazards); William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged.The Inner City, the Underclassand
PublicPolicy 42 (1987) (employment).
154 See notes 21 and 23 and accompanying text (noting that the purpose of the ECOA is to address the difficulties faced by the protected groups when applying for consumer credit).
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve acknowledged a similar point before denying
that the ECOA applies to leases. "It seems inconsistent to allow lessors to consider marital status,
sex, and other characteristics while creditors are prohibited from doing so. In addition, some lease
transactions are similar in many ways to credit transactions." 12 CFR § 202 Supplementary Information (1985).
155 The court in Brothers, 724 F2d at 793, makes a similar argument, with respect to the lease
of goods, claiming that "[wle must construe the literal language of the ECOA in light of the clear,
strong purpose evidenced by the Act and adopt an interpretation that will serve to effectuate that
purpose."

156

See note 63.

This is especially true given that the distinction between lease and credit is often arbitrary,
and that we should not let the level of legal protection vary based on such an unprincipled distinction. See Ayer, 68 Iowa L Rev at 697 (cited in note 74) ("[G]iven the subtle, sometimes arbitrary
distinction between lease and secured credit in our law, it simply is incomprehensible why so much
is made to ride on the distinction.").
157
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claims-because they have, in fact, suffered discrimination-do not sue,
either because they believe the landlord's insufficient credit reason, or
because they lack the information to determine whether the reason is
valid.", ECOA-mandated disclosure would result in an increased number
of meritorious lawsuits brought by members of this group of would-be
plaintiffs. Accordingly, ECOA application to housing leases would advance legitimate FHA claims that are not brought currently because of
landlord circumvention that leaves tenants ill informed. Disclosure would
more effectively and efficiently enforce the FHA by promoting legitimate lawsuits against discriminatory landlords.
ECOA disclosure may have the added benefit of reducing the number of ill-informed, and ultimately unsuccessful, lawsuits Currently, some
tenants, legitimately denied a lease based on their poor credit, choose to
sue nonetheless, either because they do not believe the landlord's rationale-despite its accuracy-or because when faced with insufficient information to evaluate the landlord's reason, they presume that the landlord has discriminated against them. Tenants provided with the specific
reasons their credit is inadequate may rationally decide to forgo a lawsuit
if the objective evidence presented by the landlord indicates a low probability of success. A reduction in non-meritorious lawsuits would save
time and money for landlords, tenants, and courts alike.
This potential win-win situation raises the issue of why landlords
would not provide such information, even absent regulation, if it saved
the cost of defending non-meritorious lawsuits. One explanation for
landlord inaction is a market failure caused by incomplete informationlandlords are failing to act in their own self-interest to maximize profits
because they do not know that disclosure would, on balance, be less
costly than failing to give specific reasons to rejected applicants and facing more lawsuits.' 9
2. Arguments against application of the ECOA.
An argument against applying the ECOA is the landlords' compliance cost. The ECOA, unlike the FHA,'o contains no exception for small
landlords, and therefore, applying the ECOA to all residential leases
would impose a potentially substantial reporting requirement on the

158 See discussion in Part I.C.2.
159 One might also argue that landlords, even if informed of the potential benefits of disclosure,
will continue not to provide tenants with specific reasons for adverse action, because landlords may
fear setting a precedent that would force them to provide such information in the future; a change
in circumstances, such as increased administrative costs, could undermine the landlords' rationale
that it is cost-effective to provide this information and, then, the landlords' subsequent failure to
provide reasons for a credit denial may appear to be evidence of pretextual discrimination.
160 See note 46 and accompanying text.
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owners of small businesses.16 ' We should not weigh the benefit of added
tenant protections without considering the potential costs to landlords,

involved in many repeat lease transactions over time, of having to keep
a record of the reasons for every adverse action against every potential

tenant and complying with the intricacies of the ECOA requirements.
Even assuming this reporting burden is low, the added liability faced by

landlords might be sufficient to drive some out of business, and cause
others to raise rents. Both outcomes would be perverse if our goal is to
provide optimal tenant protections because tenants would be left worse

off, with a depleted housing stock and higher rents.'6
On the other hand, the value of the improved FHA enforcement
(through increased meritorious lawsuits) will likely overwhelm any rent

increase or depletion in the housing stock caused by ECOA-mandated
reporting.'63 First, to the extent landlords keep some records and provide

some notice in the status quo, the additional cost of record keeping and
reporting imposed by the ECOA may be insignificant." Second, we can
expect the non-trivial cost of liability for illegal discrimination to be distributed consistent with the antidiscriminatory aim of the FHA. Land-

lords using bad credit as a pretext for discrimination will suffer increased
liability costs should they continue discriminating, thereby disadvantag-

ing them as compared to competing nondiscriminatory landlords. Third,
even the most disadvantaged tenants might find their options improved

if landlords distribute any added costs across all tenants.64 Finally, more
effective enforcement of the FHA could benefit all tenants by strengthening the societal norm against discrimination.

161 See 12 CFR § 202 Supplementary Information ("[C]ore provisions of Regulation B if applied to leasing transactions could impose significant burdens for certain segments of the industry.").
The applicability of the ECOA to "creditors" receiving applications for credit, without exception,
might also suggest Congress did not intend to even include landlords or leases. If Congress thought
leases were covered, they would have made a small landlord exception like they do when landlords
are covered everywhere else.
162 See Charles J.
Meyers, The Covenantof Habitabilityand the American Law Institute,27 Stan
L Rev 879 (1975) (arguing that the cost of tenant protections and landlord burdens is ultimately
passed on to consumers of rental housing). For a concise explanation of the argument that tenant
protections hurt the people they are supposed to help, see Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in
ResidentialLandlord-TenantLaw: Causes and Consequences,69 Cornell L Rev 517,578 (1984) (concluding that "[t]he highly plausible theory that increased tenant protections ... would reduce the
supply of rental housing has been neither proved nor disproved").
163 See Richard S.Markovits, The Distributive Impact,Allocative Efficiency, and OverallDesirability of Ideal Housing Codes:Some Theoretical Clarifications,89 Harv L Rev 1815 (1976) (arguing
that vigorous code enforcement will help tenants on balance).
164 For example, landlords legitimately denying leases based on poor credit already possess the
specific reasons for denial; they need only put it on paper and mail it to the denied applicant.
165 Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
HousingSubsidies and Income RedistributionPolicy,80 Yale L J 1093 (1971) (arguing, under specified conditions, enforcement of laws requiring improved housing conditions could benefit tenants
without raising rents).
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One might argue the proposal advanced thus far resembles a "caseby-case" analysis in the sense that the Comment suggests that courts look
at the text of each lease under review and then determine whether that
particular lease meets the definition of credit. Such a case-by-case ap-

proach could be fraught with high decision costs for courts 1 and inconsistent outcomes. This criticism is not particularly powerful for two reasons.
First, most landlords use standard form leases1 and parties rarely
demand alterations from the standard form. The prevalence of standard

form leases means that the explicit text of most residential leases will
vary little within an individual state. Given this uniformity," many courts
166 "Decision costs" refer to the resources expended to reach a consensual outcome, such as the
cost of gathering information. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculusof Consent:
Logical Foundationsof ConstitutionalDemocracy vi-vii, 3 (Michigan 1965) (concluding that the best
decision rule will minimize the sum of decision costs and error costs).
167 For an example of a standard form lease that (excluding mandatory state rules modifying
it) appears to avoid deferred payment and, therefore, ECOA categorization as "credit," see Sanford
Kahn, American Legal Forms No 104, Chicago Apartment Lease (unfurnished) 1 14 Forcible Detainer (1981, revised Jan 1995) ("If lessee defaults in the payment of rent... Lessor may distrain for
rent and shall have a lien on Lessee's property for all monies due Lessor...."). See also id 18,
Surrender of Premises and Return of Possession ("At the termination of this Lease, by lapse of time
or otherwise, Lessee shall yield up and surrender immediate possession to Lessor .... If Lessee fails
to vacate ... Lessee shall pay a sum equal to double the amount of rent...")168 Reliance on individual states' standard form leases may create a lack of uniformity. Similarly,
the relevant background law may vary from state to state. However, the differing standard form
leases and mandatory laws of the several states should not undermine the predictability of such a
regime. While different state laws may result in the same lease agreement being categorized differently as governing law changes, both because certain explicit provisions honored in state A will not
be honored in state B and because certain terms will be imported into the contract in state A that
will not be presumed in state B, the categorization rendered under the laws of a given state should
remain consistent.
Because states control the content of their own standard lease forms, they may have an incentive
to alter the content of such forms either to bring them under the protection of the ECOA, or, perhaps more disturbingly, to circumvent the protections of the ECOA. This criticism may be overstated
for a few reasons. First, in order to have any bite it requires proof that states would "race to the
bottom" in order to provide a climate more conducive to landlords. Absent proof that landlords have
significant political strength unopposed by tenants or proof that states have an incentive to attract
landlords (who do not benefit states through tax dollars in the same way and to the same extent as
big business) we need not fear such a race to the bottom. Beyond these initial factors, it is unlikely
that residential landlords would move from state to state based on the marginal cost of an additional
reporting requirement especially when landlords, because they own property in a given state, cannot
just pick up and move. In short, there is little evidence that states have an incentive to race to underprotect tenants in favor of landlords.
A related concern is that since the ECOA is a federal law granting a substantive right to be free
from discrimination, we are faced with a perverse outcome in a world where the ECOA applies in
some states and not in others. The concern is not a race to the bottom, but each state reacting in its
own way to a de facto delegation to the states of the power to require ECOA disclosures by landlords. Even if not a single landlord moves, landlords may lobby for revision of the mandatory lease
provisions. This criticism is similarly overstated. States that differ over whether the ECOA applies
to residential leases will not differ over the level of permissible discrimination against tenants-this
is established by the federal floors created in the FHA, for example. At most, we will have variation
between states on a proceduralissue, that is, whether disappointed would-be tenants have the fortune
of being privy to the reasons landlords found their credit reports deficient. While such information
helps undermine landlord circumvention of the FHA by exposing pretextual "bad credit" claims, see
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will incur minimal decision costs in determining whether a housing lease
constitutes credit. A related point is that often the implicit terms of the
lease, that is, the terms that are a function of the surrounding body of
state law that is imported into the lease contract, are mandatory terms. "9
In other words, requirements that leases permit the lessee to maintain
possession for a fixed period even absent rent payment are often nonwaivable. This nonwaivability simplifies the analysis because it means
that, within a particular state, the mandatory terms implicitly governing
the lease will not change from case to case and, as a result, decision costs
will turn out to be relatively low. This argument, of course, does not apply
to terms that vary from lease to lease-where there is no mandatory
term-and that affect whether a particular lease constitutes "credit."
CONCLUSION

The ECOA is the only federal law that requires creditors to disclose
to disappointed applicants the specific reason their credit is deficient
should applicants be denied based on their credit reports. Such disclosure
could be extremely useful to would-be tenants who are suing under
housing discrimination laws such as the FHA and CRA.
This Comment suggests that whether leases are governed by the
ECOA, and thus subject to its reporting requirement, turns on whether
leases constitute credit. This question, to date, has been answered by
making determinations about the general characteristics of leases and
then comparing these qualities with the characteristics of credit transactions. This Comment argues that it is better to adopt an approach that
focuses on the specific terms of the lease agreement at issue and on the
content of applicable state law governing the specific lease in order to
determine whether the given lease resembles a credit transaction.

Part I.C, its availability does not affect the existence of the substantive protections enjoyed by each
tenant.
169 See notes 146,149,150 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory rules governing possession of leased property).

